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ABSTRACT: A debate has arisen over whether “the spirit of sport” 
is an appropriate criterion for determining whether a substance 
should be banned. In this paper, I argue that the criterion is crucial 
for Olympic sport because Olympism celebrates humanity, specifi-
cally human agency, so we need to preserve the degree to which ath-
letes are personally and morally responsible for their performances. 
This emphasis on what I call “athlete agency” is reflected metaphysi-
cally in the structure of sport, which characteristically prescribes 
inefficiencies in order to create challenges, and seeks to reduce or 
eliminate the proportion of a performance outside an athlete’s con-
trol. Emphasizing athlete agency also prevents wealthier and more 
technologically developed countries from using their resources to 
gain an advantage in sport. Interpreted according to athlete agency, 
the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) “spirit of sport” can 
be clarified to imply that substances, techniques, and equipment 
that reduce athlete agency should be reduced or eliminated, while 
things that increase it should be encouraged.
KEYWORDS: Olympism, doping, technology, spirit of sport
Introduction
Imagine a common college student who has not done his homework facing the 
following pop quiz:
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 Why is doping banned from Olympic sport?
 A. Because it improves sport performance
 B. Because it poses a risk to the athlete’s health
 C. Because it violates the spirit of sport
 D. All of the above
 E. None of the above [write in the correct reason]
Working on process of elimination, the student immediately crosses out option A 
because almost everything an athlete does is dedicated to improving their perfor-
mance; improved performance clearly is what sport is all about. He recalls from an 
earlier lesson that the Olympic motto is “Faster, Higher, Stronger,” so he crosses out 
option C, since it is hard to imagine what the “spirit of sport” could mean if it rules 
out improving performance. Next, “All of the above” can be eliminated just by logic 
since A and C are false. That leaves B or E. It makes sense to protect athlete safety, 
but many sports are already risky and some banned substances actually contribute to 
an athlete’s health or healing. The answer, our imaginary student concludes, must be 
“None of the above,” and the correct reason must be marketing or tradition or just 
because the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are a bunch of naïve idealists 
who do not understand modern sport.
 After more than twenty years of teaching undergraduates, I find this scenario 
completely plausible. I also know the correct answer to the question is D, “all of the 
above.” As a scholar of Olympic Studies and the philosophy of sport, however, I real-
ize that this hypothetical student’s reasoning is not far off from that of my colleagues. 
It is for this reason that I finally entered the doping debate with an invited response 
to an excellent article by Loland in the American Journal of Bioethics.1 Loland’s article 
attempts to distinguish between morally acceptable and unacceptable means of per-
formance enhancement by appeal to a biological distinction between training and 
doping.2 While agreeing in principle with Loland’s argument, I contended that such 
distinctions carry little moral weight in a community driven by what I call the “Effi-
ciency Ethos”—a set of values that privileges a quantitative understanding of athletic 
performance.3 “If, under the Efficiency Ethos, the spirit of sport just is perfecting 
performance through any legal means necessary,” I wrote, “talk about substances like 
EPO violating this spirit begs the question.”4 It seems to me that since inefficiency is 
inherent to the metaphysical nature of sport, no special justification is needed to add 
performance enhancers to the list of efficiencies banned.5 From the perspective of the 
Efficiency Ethos (and that of our hypothetical student), however, this argument also 
begs the question of what the “spirit of sport” truly is. In what follows I will argue 
that the WADA’s spirit of sport criterion can be clarified in such a way that it not 
only appeals to moral intuitions and Olympic ideals, but also offers criteria capable 
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of commanding moral authority in a community dominated by the Efficiency Ethos. 
The concept I propose for doing this is athlete agency.
The Perils of Precision
The only people who disagree that WADA’s spirit of sport criterion needs clarifica-
tion are those who believe that it should be eliminated altogether, leaving enhance-
ment and health risk as the only criteria for whether the use of a substance or tech-
nique should be prohibited. This is more or less the opinion of Henne, Koh, and 
McDermott, and they are far from alone.6 Kornbeck argues that the spirit of sport 
is irretrievably subjective.7 Waddington et. al. complain that the criterion is vague, 
“as is apparent from the fact that almost all of [the criterion’s] eleven descriptors are 
compatible with doping. And those that are not, are not compatible with elite sport 
either.”8 That last comment paints a rather jarring picture of sport, given the eleven 
descriptors in question:
 1. Ethics, fair play and honesty
 2. Health
 3. Excellence in performance
 4. Character and education
 5. Fun and joy
 6. Teamwork
 7. Dedication and commitment
 8. Respect for rules and laws
 9. Respect for self and other participants
 10. Courage
 11. Community and solidarity
The point here is not that ethics, honesty, and respect for the rules do not matter, 
however, but rather that using certain substances (and Henne, Koh, and McDermott 
here have in mind recreational drugs like marijuana) is only unethical in the first 
place because it is against the rules. Geeraets, meanwhile, contends that “values like 
courage make no sense as criteria” for what constitutes doping in the first place.9 As 
McNamee pointed out in 2013, however, “values characterize an ideal, they do not 
provide a definition or description.”10
 In seeking clarification of the spirit of sport, furthermore, we must be careful 
what we wish for. As the sad history of Olympic “amateurism” reveals, the attempt 
to codify an Olympic ideal can easily backfire. The very clear rules designed to keep 
Olympic sport from being about money, arguably had the effect of doing the exact 
opposite of what they were supposed to. Amateur codes were also used both to 
slip social biases into rules supposed to be about sport and to preserve the athletic 
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advantages enjoyed by the upper classes.11 Keeping in mind the danger that comes 
with leaving room for interpretation, however, I believe that a certain amount of 
vagueness is needed to avoid legalism and allow for effective judgment. Indeed, it is 
circular to use “respect for rules” as a reason why something should be against the 
rules, and Geeraets is right to ask for a criterion that can be “properly applied.”12 
Recently, McNamee and Loland have proposed a solution that eliminates the eleven 
descriptors, agreeing with others that they do not enhance the selective power of 
the criteria.13 I agree that the task should be to achieve a coherent understanding of 
the spirit of sport that reliably guides judgment—not to eliminate the criterion or 
reduce it to a formula.
 I suggest that we begin that process not by nitpicking the list of descriptors of 
the spirit of sport, but rather by examining the preamble to that list in the “Funda-
mental Rationale for the World Anti-Doping Code”: “Anti-doping programs seek 
to preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport. This intrinsic value is often 
referred to as ‘the spirit of sport.’ It is the essence of Olympism, the pursuit of 
human excellence through the dedicated perfection of each person’s natural talents. 
It is how we play true. The spirit of sport is the celebration of the human spirit, 
body and mind, and is reflected in values we find in and through sport.”14 I think 
there are three key ideas worth analyzing here. First, the idea of intrinsic value; 
second, the emphasis on humanism (human excellence, human spirit); third and 
most important, the statement that the spirit of sport is the essence of Olympism. To 
better understand what the intrinsic values of sports are, we should examine their 
metaphysics. To honor the emphasis on humanism, we should focus on sport’s most 
human element, which I will describe as “agency.” And to unpack the essence of 
Olympism, we should turn to the Fundamental Principles of Olympism as stated in 
the Olympic Charter. By examining these three notions in reverse order, I will dem-
onstrate that the spirit of sport may be better applied as a criterion by maximizing 
the proportion of sport performance attributable to athlete agency and minimizing 
extrinsic factors, including wealth and access to technology.
The Essence of Olympism
The first Fundamental Principle of Olympism has endured for decades with minimal 
change. In the 2018 Olympic Charter, it reads:
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole 
the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education, 
Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educa-
tional value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal fun-
damental ethical principles.15
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In my 2015 analysis of Olympism as a philosophy, I concluded that “Olympism is 
a philosophy of what can be achieved through sport, rather than a philosophy of 
sport per se.”16 As the second Fundamental Principle of Olympism makes clear, what 
it wants to achieve is irreducibly humanistic: “The goal of Olympism is to place 
sport at the service of the harmonious development of humankind, with a view to 
promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity.”17 It 
is not stated precisely what this human development entails, but that is appropriate 
since the concept has to be flexible enough to serve a global movement that takes 
itself to be multicultural rather than hegemonic. I think it is very clear, however, 
that “human development” in the context of Olympism is not to be equated with 
“human performance,” understood in terms of quantified athletic achievement, such 
as running a four-minute mile or setting a world record. Such feats, in and of them-
selves, have little social value. As stated in the first fundamental principle, the human 
development sought by Olympism is characterized by “a balanced whole [of ] body, 
will and mind,” and it is to be achieved through “a way of life based on the joy of 
effort.”18 Furthermore, it has a distinctly social dimension that entails respect for 
ethics, responsibility, and human dignity.
 It is also very clear that we are not just talking about sport here, and worth 
noting that these human ideals apply not just to athletes, but to “all individuals and 
entities” in the Olympic Movement, as stated in the third fundamental principle.19 
Every athlete, coach, administrator, official, bureaucrat, and sponsor is expected to 
keep the global humanistic goals of Olympism in mind as they make their daily 
choices—as they chose their “way of life.” And they are expected to be aware of “the 
educational value of good example,” a concept which implies the educational danger 
of a bad example. This idea reflects Jean-Paul Sartre’s ethical insight that in choosing 
for myself, I chose for all humankind.20 The way we live our lives makes a statement 
about how we think human life should be lived. The social impact of our ethical 
choices is so unavoidable, thought Sartre, awareness of it causes nausea—the kind 
of nausea an Olympic athlete may experience in sport. The crucial point, however, 
is that Olympism is not primarily concerned with athletes or sport; it is concerned 
with humanity and with international community.
 So how can the spirit of sport be the essence of Olympism if Olympism is 
not primarily about sport? As I concluded in my 2015 analysis, Olympism is less a 
philosophy of sport than a philosophy of what can be achieved through sport.21 Sport 
is the means by which the Olympic Movement tries to realize its humanistic goals, 
and, as we shall see, the metaphysics of sport provides the clues for how Olympism’s 
humanitarian goals may be achieved.22 To those, such as McNamee and Loland, 
who say that Olympism should be removed from the WADA code because it does 
not represent a universal view and not all sports are Olympic sports, I reply that 
Olympism’s articulation of the social purpose of sport underpins the moral authority 
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of the code.23 The crucial thing we learn from understanding WADA’s spirit of sport 
criterion as a distilled form of Olympism is that it is about human beings and not 
athletic performance; about global community and not just sport.
Spirit of Sport and Athlete Agency
It makes sense to describe Olympism as the spirit of sport even if every sport is 
not part of the Olympic Games because the metaphysical structure of sport itself 
supports Olympism’s emphasis on humanity and community. In his 2002 book, 
Fair Play: A Moral Norm System, Loland develops a whole list of moral norms that 
can be derived from the structure of sport. Fundamental among these is “Equality 
of Opportunity,” which is conveniently symbolized by such ubiquitous features 
of sport structures as a common starting line, changing sides of a court halfway 
through the contest, or requiring contestants to use comparable equipment. The 
purpose of these is to compensate for what Loland calls “irrelevant inequalities,” that 
give one competitor an advantage over the other.24 If, for example, a football field 
runs slightly uphill, the advantage of attacking the downhill goal can be equalized 
by switching sides at the half. In cases where it is impractical for all competitors to 
use identical equipment, for example because it is adapted for different biological 
characteristics like height and weight, that equipment is regulated to prevent a com-
petitive advantage. Even in the case of biological differences, such as sex or body size, 
different classes of competition are organized to compensate.
 It should be observed that the inequalities Loland calls “non-relevant” are 
quite relevant to athletic performance. Height and mass may provide an advantage in 
many sports, as do biological sex characteristics, so measures, usually classifications, 
are made to compensate for them. High performance sports equipment, meanwhile, 
is marketed and coveted for the athletic advantage it provides, even as the rules try to 
minimize such advantages. I often hear of cycling equipment that will “save watts” in 
competition. The claim here, of course, is not that the athlete will actually produce 
more watts when they use that equipment, but rather that their quantitatively mea-
sured performance will be equal to someone who produces more watts but lacks the 
advantage provided by the bearing cartridge, aerodynamic helmet, or whatever it is. 
Most sports’ rules regulate or compensate for such advantages because, despite the 
marketing rhetoric, they are irrelevant to sport in the same way certain biological 
differences are.
 I believe that what is behind the moral intuition that these inequalities should 
be regulated or banned is the fact that they account for a portion of the athlete’s 
“performance” that is not a product of her own agency, and as such they do not con-
tribute to the human development sought through sport by Olympism. In my 2018 
response to Loland, I illustrated this idea as follows. Imagine everything that goes 
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into an athletic performance depicted on a pie chart. Some things, such as strength 
and endurance acquired through training, are a product of the athlete’s personal 
agency. Others, including what Loland calls “biological background conditions and 
constraints” (such as an athlete’s genetic profile) are not a product of her agency.25 
Applying that model to Michael Phelps’s performance at the Beijing Olympics, we 
might say that factors such as strategy and stroke efficiency, which were a product of 
training and experience, made a legitimate contribution to his victory, whereas the 
efficiency provided by his hydrodynamic bodysuit (since banned) did not because it 
actually reduced the proportion of the performance attributable to the athlete’s agency. I 
argued that Phelps’s victories gained their value from the proportion of the perfor-
mance that was, in Loland’s words, “the unique expression of an individual,” and 
not his access to external resources like the suit.26
 The distinction between the proportion of the performance derived from ath-
lete agency and the proportion derived from extrinsic factors is important because 
we praise Olympic victors for their athletic performance. In moral theory, praise and 
blame are appropriate only to the extent that a person is morally responsible for the act 
in question. In the words of ethicist Andrew Eshleman, “to be morally responsible 
for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, 
blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it.”27 In Olympic sport, 
we single out athletic victors for ceremonial honors, lavish them with rhetorical 
praise, and interview them about their accomplishments. In short, we exhibit the 
three characteristic behaviors that indicate an assumption of moral responsibility: 
applying ethical predicates such as “good,” or “courageous;” displaying “reactive atti-
tudes” such as gratitude, respect, and indignation; and expecting agents to explain 
their achievements.28 Those who would separate virtue from victory in sport must 
be prepared to forgo the moral adulation (and perhaps the financial reward) that 
goes with it.
 The moral responsibility associated with athletic victory assumes what I call 
athlete agency—the idea that the athlete herself is the primary cause of her per-
formance. The concept is a variant of human agency, which can be defined as the 
ability to act with certain intentions and/or to be the cause of certain outcomes.29 
Metaphysically speaking, the concept of human agency is fraught—attached as it is 
to such perennial problems as free will and intentionality.30 However, we need not 
resolve these philosophical puzzles to connect the athletic concept of deserved vic-
tory with factors under an athlete’s control.31 The intuition implied by the principle 
of equal opportunity, a fundamental feature of the metaphysics of sport itself, is 
that we want as much as possible for the athlete himself to be the cause of his own 
performance because this is what makes him worthy of praise or blame.32
 Let me pause my argument for a moment to address some anticipated chal-
lenges to the idea of athlete agency I am promoting here. Critics will say that the 
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decision to take drugs may also be an act of athlete agency, maybe even athletic 
virtue, as long as it is voluntary and informed. The proportion of my performance 
due to my choices of equipment, supplements, or drugs is just as human as the pro-
portion due to training and healthy diet; it is only the pre-existing ban on such sub-
stances and measures that casts moral derision on them.33 I grant that performance 
enhancing substances and techniques are the product of human beings, that athletes 
may choose to adopt them freely and intentionally, just as they choose to adopt a 
certain strategy, and that sports are set up to reward superior athletic performance. 
There is a distinction, however, between EPO being a product of human ingenuity 
and the athlete’s performance being, as much as possible, a product of their own 
agency.34
 The idea behind athlete agency is for the athlete herself to be the direct and 
active cause of her athletic performance; her decision to use EPO, even if informed 
and voluntary, makes her at best an indirect cause of the proportion of her perfor-
mance that is attributable to the increased hematocrit caused by the drug.35 Even 
when the technology in question is the product of the same athlete’s engineering skill 
and creativity, as was the case with cyclist-engineer Graeme Obree’s hour-record in 
cycling, the performance advantage gained by it was due to increased aerodynamic 
efficiency, not the athlete’s agency.36 Let me illustrate with a thought-experiment. 
Imagine the record-setting Obree racing against himself on a normal bike in a legal 
position and winning by 30 seconds. That margin of victory would be attributable 
not to the athlete—who in this thought experiment is identical to the athlete he 
defeats—but rather to the advantages provided by his equipment. The principle of 
athlete agency seeks to reduce or eliminate such advantage and maximize the extent 
to which the athlete is the direct and active cause of his performance.
Spirit of Sport and Inefficiency
To reiterate, the spirit of sport, understood as the essence of Olympism, envisions 
athletic competition as a means to the end of personal and social human develop-
ment. As such, its goal is not to achieve ever-improved sports performances, but 
rather ever-improved people and communities. To achieve such social goals, sport 
must emphasize athlete agency. The Olympic motto, citius, altius, fortius (faster, 
higher, stronger) may “express the aspirations of the Olympic Movement,” as it 
says in the Olympic Charter, but it is not part of the Fundamental Principles of 
Olympism and does not describe the Olympic Movement’s goals.37 If the goal of 
Olympic sport was really to see how high a person can go, it would allow the use 
of rocket ships. As it is, Olympic contests adjudicated according to height limit 
the use of technology to vaulting poles, and only then because that event presents 
a distinct set of challenges from the high jump. As a matter of fact, limitation of 
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performance-enhancing technology is embedded into the fundamental nature of 
sport.38 As Bernard Suits observed decades ago, sports are essentially “the voluntary 
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles,” where “rules prohibit use of more effi-
cient in favour of less efficient means.”39 The reason that technological efficiencies 
that reduce athlete agency are discouraged or even banned in sport is that prescribed 
inefficiencies create challenges, which push human beings to improve themselves—
and not just in terms of athletic performance.40 Given that human improvement 
is the goal of Olympism and therefore the spirit of sport, the inefficiencies of sport 
must be preserved.
 The problem with performance-enhancing technologies, fundamentally, is 
that they attempt to overcome a sport’s prescribed inefficiencies by some means 
other than the human virtues those obstacles were intended to stimulate.41 The 
sport says I have to get from A to B as quickly as possible, then proscribes any means 
more efficient than travel by foot. If I put plastic springs in my shoes or ingest a 
substance that allows my blood to carry more oxygen than it normally would, I may 
complete my task more efficiently, but I will not have achieved any higher level of 
the human development sought by Olympism, even if I win. In fact, insofar as my 
margin of victory is due to some factor other than the human development sport is 
supposed to encourage, I may deprive a competitor more deserving of the victory 
in terms of moral responsibility. Indeed, in sports long associated with doping, like 
professional cycling, victory can be as much a cause for moral suspicion as it is for 
moral praise. And often the moral suspicion is not specifically that the cyclist broke 
the rules, as the boos directed at Chris Froome the 2018 Tour de France illustrate.42 
Such moral suspicion and reluctance to praise certain cases of athletic success derive 
from the idea that something other than athlete agency is accounting for victory. It 
also illustrates the fact that victory reaps much (if not all) of its popular value from 
its association with virtue.
 Although the “spirit of sport” should be used as a criterion to determine which 
techniques and substances should be legal to use, it is not itself a matter of legality. 
In other words, a substance or technique does not comply with the spirit of sport 
by virtue of its being legal, the way Froome’s use of Ventolin was legal if it stayed 
under the predetermined threshold for therapeutic doses.43 This is why abolitionists 
are wrong when they claim that the moral problems associated with doping will be 
eliminated if the ban is simply lifted. Participants in the social practice of sport tend 
to have similar moral intuitions about illegitimate means of performance enhance-
ment; even convicted dope-cheats affirm the same intuition when they point out 
that they still had to train as hard as their competitors, or claim to have been coerced 
by the belief that their competitors were doping so this was the only way to “level 
the playing field.” A similar moral intuition applies to equipment. I remember Greg 
Lemond saying in a personal interview, “the cyclist who won the race would still have 
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won even if he was riding the last placed rider’s bike.” The fact that his statement 
conflicts with the logic of sports equipment marketing, including ads that Lemond 
himself was appearing in at the time, may help to explain why the principles of inef-
ficiency and equality of opportunity embedded in the very structure of sport, are so 
easily forgotten or overlooked. Efficiencies threaten the spirit of sport by undermin-
ing athlete agency.
Spirit of Sport and Accessibility
The expense and exclusivity of high-tech performance enhancers highlights another 
overlooked aspect of the spirit of sport: accessibility. Every athlete has equal access 
to her own agency (so to speak), but not every athlete has equal access to exter-
nal resources that improve performance. Recalling that the Olympic Movement is 
global, and that the goal of Olympism is not just individual human development 
but “promotion of a peaceful society,” rules makers need to be especially sensitive 
to performance advantages that can be bought. Huge economic disparities among 
countries and individual athletes routinely threaten the principle of Equal Oppor-
tunity and undermine the ideal of athlete agency. The same is true of technological 
innovations that are provided exclusively to one athlete or team. The notion of being 
able to buy an advantage helps to fuel the sponsorship economy in many modern 
sports, but it is contrary to the “spirit of sport” understood Olympically. Most sports, 
like cycling, have rules that prohibit the use of equipment that is not available on the 
consumer market. Others, such as bobsleigh, allow proprietary equipment. Olympic 
sailing, meanwhile, uses strictly defined classes that all but eliminate performance 
differences between boats thereby increasing the proportion of the performance due 
to athlete agency.
 Indeed, the sport of sailing provides a good illustration of the reasons why 
Olympic sport, at least, should limit performance aids to resources widely available 
across the globe. The America’s Cup may be more prestigious than Olympic sailing 
races, but that event allows—even emphasizes—boat design and engineering. As 
a result, only the wealthiest and most technologically advanced teams are able to 
compete.44 In their long history, which goes all the way back to the eighth century 
BCE, the Olympic Games have witnessed repeated attempts by the upper classes 
to use their wealth and privilege to gain advantages in sport. In ancient Greece, 
for example, after lower-class athletes began winning victories in “gymnic” events 
like running and wrestling, the elites introduced equestrian events—in which the 
owner of the horse received the victor’s wreath—in order to preserve their access to 
victory.45 The current push to allow performance-enhancing technologies in sport 
in the name of such “human” values as freedom and autonomy, appears to me 
to be motivated rather by wealthier and more technologically advanced nations 
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attempting to exploit those advantages in the Olympic Games and other sports.46 
The Olympic Movement can promote athlete agency and the spirit of sport in an 
international context by emphasizing basic, widely accessible sports like running 
and soccer, while minimizing the effect of economic advantage in sports like sailing, 
cycling, and bobsleigh.
 The Olympic Movement may never be able to define the spirit of sport in a 
way that allows for easy application. In fact, efforts to codify such a concept may 
well lead to disaster, as with the aforementioned case of “amateurism.” We can make 
an effort to better understand and clarify it, though, and that is what I am trying 
to do in this paper. I think that confusion about the spirit of sport criterion derives 
from a lack of interest in Olympism and a lack of perspective about the objectives of 
the Olympic Movement and of sport itself as a human practice. The spirit of sport 
is not just about doping, rules, or sport—it is about promoting human agency by 
preserving inefficiency and providing accessibility. A good way to apply the spirit 
of sport criterion is simply to prohibit substances and techniques that decrease the 
proportion of athletic performance attributable to the athlete’s agency and to permit 
and even encourage things that increase that proportion.
 Obviously, my clarification of the spirit of sport in terms of athlete agency 
does not provide the kind of sharp definitional boundaries that make regulation (as 
well as gaming the system) easy. Decisions about individual techniques and sub-
stances will need to be made by a committee of judges with experience and knowl-
edge of sport and its history. For example, we might perform my thought experiment 
in which an athlete competes against herself to determine whether an energy drink 
undermines athlete agency and conclude that it does because she runs a marathon 
ten seconds faster than she would have consuming only water; we might even con-
clude that water undermines athlete agency compared to nothing. A knowledgeable 
committee using all three of WADA’s criteria, however, is very unlikely to consider 
the drink a sufficient threat to athlete agency to justify its ban. The spirit of sport is 
one of three criteria for deciding what should be banned, not a strict definition. My 
hope is that understanding the spirit of sport in terms of human agency will help 
rules committees justify the bans on things that threaten the values that underpin 
Olympic sport.
Conclusion
I admit that my understanding of the spirit of sport in terms of athlete agency, 
combined with my claim that modern sport is dominated by an “Efficiency Ethos,” 
may seem apocalyptic. But I am not at all a nihilist when it comes to sport and its 
spirit. I believe that sport is a great teacher of its own intrinsic value, especially for 
those who participate in it. This is why most athletes understand that technological 
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efficiency may sell products, but it also undermines sport’s values and threatens the 
crucial connection between victory and virtue. Even with the all the ills that sport in 
general and the Olympic Games in particular have experienced in the last century or 
so, both remain an important part of modern life. Perhaps they are so familiar now 
that we no longer feel the need to question their purpose or aspirations. We may 
even wonder why modern societies push for ever more social liberty while insisting 
on draconian rules in sport. At least, I hope we wonder. Because it’s only by wonder-
ing about the nature and purpose of sport and the Olympic Games that we can open 
ourselves up to the answers, which happily can be found embedded within them.
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